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This article aims to contribute to the debate about
the obstacles and challenges to implementing
social crime prevention in South Africa. It does so
by engaging briefly with three questions:
• How can the state response to crime in the 
post-1994 period be characterised?
• What are the obstacles to social crime 
prevention in South Africa?
• Is it correct to assume that social crime 
prevention strategies could contribute
(significantly) to solving the problem of crime
and violence in South Africa?
Before attempting answers to these questions it is
important to clarify what we mean by social crime
prevention.
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Since the release of the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) in May 1996, social crime prevention
has been a key concept in debates about how to address the problems of crime and violence in South
Africa. Many in the civil society policy community firmly believe that social crime prevention, if properly
implemented, will be effective in addressing crime and violence. Since the late 1990s there has also been a
pervasive sense of disappointment and frustration amongst those who support social crime prevention
about what is perceived as a failure of the state to back this agenda. There is a view that this is due to the
fact that the state favours 'law enforcement', because it holds out the promise of quick results. It is true
that the issue of social crime prevention is entirely absent from the current government discourse on
crime, which is characterised by a strong emphasis on robust policing measures. But is it true that the
main obstacle to social crime prevention is a law enforcement orientated mindset on the part of
government – or are there other obstacles to the social crime prevention agenda? 
SOCIAL CRIME PREVENTION 
The interest in social crime prevention emerges
partly from evidence that the criminal justice
system, though a critical component of any
society's response to crime, ultimately can only
partially prevent crime.1 In addition, the process
of criminalisation – by which people are labelled
as 'criminals' through measures such as arrest,
prosecution, and incarceration – frequently
reinforces the tendency or disposition that some
individuals have towards criminal behaviour.2 It is
commonly accepted that a balance is necessary
between social crime prevention interventions
and law enforcement. But what is social crime
prevention?
 
For the purposes of this article social crime
prevention can be understood as those strategies
and measures which (i) are carried out by
organisations or agencies (both state and non-
governmental) outside of the criminal justice
system (CJS) with the aim of reducing the risk
factors for criminal and/or violent behaviour;3 or,
(ii) if they are located within or linked to the
criminal justice system, focus on improving the
resilience of perpetrators against further
involvement in crime. 
South African and international literature about
crime4 points to the interaction between a range
of individual, familial and societal factors that
influence individual behaviour. These factors, that
in combination or separately influence behaviour
to commit crime or not commit crime, are
referred to as risk and resilience factors. 
The social crime prevention agenda received a
boost in 2008 with the establishment of an
initiative calling itself Action for a Safe South
Africa (AFSSA). AFSSA's programme of action
framed social crime prevention within eight
potential areas of intervention, including, but not
limited to:
• Investment in early childhood (e.g. through 
preschool enrichment programmes, home
visitation programmes and parenting support)5
• Measures to reduce domestic violence and 
improve parenting
• Providing quality after-school care to learners
• Addressing alcohol-related crime through 
reducing the sale and marketing of alcohol 
The social crime prevention agenda is broad and
also encompasses law enforcement aspects such as
reducing the number of firearms in society.
However, as partly reflected in AFSSA, there
appears to be some kind of emerging consensus
about the need to focus on 'developmental' crime
prevention, which involves a range of possible
interventions intended to optimise the ability of
children and young people to grow into physically
and emotionally healthy adults who are able to
lead pro-social lifestyles and engage in a positive
way with educational and other opportunities.
This approach is informed both by international
evidence as well as domestic studies of crime and
criminals. Developmental crime prevention
measures include a spectrum of interventions. For
instance, they may include interventions with
young pregnant women in disadvantaged
communities to inform them about the potential
damage of alcohol use to their unborn children.
They may also include a variety of other
interventions focused on parents or pre-school or
school-going children, as well as programmes
with young adults intended to support them in
acquiring work-related skills.6
The approach to understanding social crime
prevention that is put forward here is therefore
narrower than that put forward in the NCPS. The
NCPS appears to have conceived of social crime
prevention in very broad and expansive terms.
For instance, analysts who were involved in the
development of the NCPS spoke of it as
incorporating an 'emphasis on crime as a social
rather than a security issue' and 'the attempt to
establish a victim-centred system of restorative
justice rather than a state-centred system of
punitive justice'.7
CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE
RESPONSES TO CRIME, POST-1994
A simplified analysis of the trajectory of crime
prevention policy in South Africa since 1994
would have it that until the late 1990s social crime
prevention was, at least in theory, considered to
be an important element of crime combating, but
that subsequently there has been a wholesale shift
to a focus on law enforcement. 
The NCPS itself included an analysis of crime as a
product of social forces, yet fell short of carrying
forward this analysis into its proposals.8 The most
credible and detailed proposals put forward by
the NCPS related to strengthening the criminal
justice process on the basis that 'an effective and
legitimate criminal justice system is a vital
foundation for crime prevention and the
protection of human rights'. The other proposals
within the NCPS are a long way away from what
can be called a full agenda for social crime
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prevention, though they do include a call for
measures to address 'public values' as well as
environmental design to 'reduce the opportunities
for crime and facilitate law enforcement'.9 The
focus on the criminal justice system that emerged
in the period subsequent to the NCPS might
therefore be seen partly as a product of the
emphasis on the criminal justice system within the
NCPS itself, as well as being a response to severe
and sustained public pressure on the state to
respond to high levels of violent crime. 
A more coherent social crime prevention agenda
was put forward by the 1998 White Paper on
Safety and Security. Alongside an emphasis on
strengthening law enforcement and criminal
justice reform, the White Paper motivated for
'developmental crime prevention' aimed at young
people and families; situational crime prevention;
and 'community crime prevention' to be targeted
at specific geographic areas.10, 11 Though the White
Paper was approved by Cabinet in September
1998, none of these social crime prevention
policies were given any impetus by government.
Shortly afterwards the Secretariat for Safety and
Security, the body that had developed the White
Paper, was downgraded and marginalised in terms
of its contribution to crime prevention policy.
Antony Altbeker has argued against the idea that
state policy has been law enforcement orientated.
He suggests that there has been a failure of law
enforcement and attributes this to an established
orthodoxy within the state which gave emphasis to
(not necessarily 'social') crime prevention.
Altbeker's argument is that there has been limited
investment in key elements necessary for a law
enforcement agenda to succeed, most notably the
development of the criminal justice system's
detective and prosecution capacity.12 Yet, in so far
as a crime prevention agenda has been pursued
within the police or other government
departments, it cannot be said that this has been
pursued with any rigour, if at all. Within the SAPS,
for instance, crime prevention has tended to be
associated with implementation of the Domestic
Violence Act or victim empowerment, and there
cannot be said to have been any clearly articulated
understanding of the police role in proactive crime
prevention.13 Though it is true that the NCPS was
often referred to by politicians and others on
public platforms, the term NCPS was more of a
euphemism for some undefined comprehensive
crime policy, rather than signifying any concrete
programme of interventions.
While the detective service has not until recently
been the subject of focused investment, there has
been enormous investment in the criminal justice
system. Since the early 1990s this has been partly
directed towards massive expansion of the number
of serving members of the SAPS. In their analysis
of the NCPS Simpson and Rauch point out that
from the start there was tension between the long-
term developmental approach and the reactive
policing approach. The publication of the police's
annual strategy document at the same time as the
public release of the NCPS undermined the
message that the NCPS had intended to promote,
namely that long-term strategies to prevent crime
were an important aspect of the overall approach
to crime reduction. 
A weak state 
What tends to be ignored by both camps within
this debate is that ineffectiveness has been a
characteristic not only of the criminal justice
system, but of very large parts of the public service.
For instance, as in the criminal justice sector, South
Africa has made massive investments in education
by the standards of countries at similar levels of
economic development, but with very poor results.
There are several systemic reasons for the problems
with delivery and the dysfunctionality of
government departments. In Karl Von Holdt's
analysis14 of the reasons for the dysfunctionality in
the public health system, which appear relevant to
the criminal justice system, these include:
• Understaffing and shortages of resources 
related to the ways in which the budget is
managed.
• Poor institutional and system design. In the 
case of hospitals, personnel are managed in
silos so that the overall functionality of the
entire institution is not the priority of any
particular manager.
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• The imperative to ensure the racial 
transformation of state departments creates a
situation where skills are not the most
important criteria for appointment. A low
premium is thus placed on skills (Von Holdt
refers to it as ambivalence to skill). This is
exacerbated by the fact that in the context of a
skills shortage there are numerous
opportunities for 'upward mobility'. Combined
with the fact that promotion is not linked to
performance, and that there is no clear career
pathing related to merit, this means that
government employees move 'onwards and
upwards' between departments, rather than
developing skill and knowledge within a
specific department.
• Related to this focus by staff on upward 
mobility rather than on the delivery of
services, is an absence of a 'culture' of service. 
• Finally, Von Holdt refers to a breakdown of 
discipline, something that has been reported
as being a feature of the SAPS.15
The new administration under Jacob Zuma has
signalled that issues of delivery, and alongside
this, skills and competence, are to be given more
importance. But it is not clear whether this will
indeed result in a shift of priorities, as the
questions of racial redress in South Africa are still
politically and socially important. Indeed, without
purposeful changes to the culture of management
and consistent improvements to recruitment and
promotion processes throughout state institutions,
a commitment from the top is unlikely to have a
major impact on delivery. It may be that the best
that can be hoped for are modest improvements
in the functioning of public sector institutions. 
Other facets of state criminal 
justice policy 
Despite this, it is important to acknowledge that
developments within the criminal justice arena
have not been one-dimensional. A number of
highly sophisticated policy instruments, including
the Domestic Violence Act (1998), the Firearms
Control Act (2000), and the Child Justice Act
(2009) have now become part of South African
law. While the implementation of all these
measures takes place, in whole or in part, within
the CJS environment, they are all sophisticated
violence and crime prevention measures.16 These
measures give the lie to the idea that criminal
justice policy is wholly law enforcement
orientated. 
Rather than being characterised as primarily 'law
enforcement' or 'crime prevention' orientated, in
some ways the primary characteristic of state
crime prevention policy, particularly in the post-
1999 period, has been its impoverishment.
Notwithstanding the fact that some sophisticated
policy measures have been introduced, there has
been an absence of an overall approach orientated
towards the development and implementation of
measures in all relevant departments (not only
the CJS) that are likely to have a meaningful
impact on crime. In addition to this, the criminal
justice environment has until relatively recently
been characterised by poorly conceived and badly
executed measures, such as the 'slash and burn'
approach to specialised units. 
In summary, the state policy environment has
been characterised by a strong focus on the
criminal justice system. A combination of factors,
including weak management and leadership and a
related lack of properly conceived policies, has
undermined the impact of the investment in this
system. Furthermore, despite the introduction of
creative legislative measures, and a rhetorical
commitment to the NCPS, there has been little
tangible investment in social crime prevention by
national government.   
WHAT ARE THE OBSTACLES 
TO CONSOLIDATING A SOCIAL
CRIME PREVENTION AGENDA 
IN SOUTH AFRICA?
The above analysis implies that the principal
obstacle to the consolidation and implementation
of social crime prevention measures has been the
weakness of the state rather than a firmly law
enforcement orientated agenda. 
As suggested by the discussion above, it is not
possible, nor accurate, to characterise the
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approach of the state to crime as simply 'law
enforcement orientated'. Politicians and police
leaders have used 'tough on crime' rhetoric, but
this has not been a consistent feature of criminal
justice in South Africa and has often been more a
reflection of the absence of a coherent policy
direction rather than the statement of a clear
agenda. 
However, since the criminal justice review process
(initiated in 2006), there has indeed been a shift
towards strengthening the crime investigation and
prosecution process, albeit with limited success.
Yet political leaders and policy makers are not
altogether unsympathetic to the social crime
prevention agenda. For instance, during 2009 the
Department of Social Development has been
involved in developing a crime prevention
strategy and has been investing in community-
based youth development and after school care
projects. More generally, it might reasonably be
assumed that many state officials see the large
financial investment that has been made in
education and social grants partly as an
investment in reducing crime. Indeed, state policy
in South Africa is strongly socially orientated. 
What nevertheless seems to be true is that the
awareness of social crime prevention within those
components of government that are specifically
focused on crime (i.e. the criminal justice
ministries and departments) is absent. The
current focus is on escalating the 'war on crime'
through the criminal justice system. There are no
references to the need for social crime prevention
measures within this discourse, and the discourse
characterises criminals as 'other' or outside of
'normal' society. While the Justice, Crime
Prevention and Security (JCPS) cluster of cabinet
until recently included the ministers of social
development and education, it has now been
restructured to exclusively involve the ministers
involved in security and criminal justice. But even
when they were part of the JCPS, the role played
by the 'social' ministers was of a secondary nature.
The Department of Social Development has been
involved in developing a social crime prevention
strategy, but it is clear that this is not seen as a
matter of urgency or a priority within
government's overall response to crime. The
ANC's election manifesto of 2009 was exclusively
focused on strengthening the criminal justice
system and community cooperation with the
criminal justice system.
In addition to this, the state does face increasing
pressure on the fiscus. There are thus questions
about what type of investment in social crime
prevention is necessary in order for such
investment to achieve results, and whether such
investment is possible in the current environment.
And where will the funds come from? Social
crime prevention advocates may argue that
investments should be made in social crime
prevention rather than in policing or other
aspects of criminal justice, even though they
acknowledge that law enforcement is also
important. These arguments may become even
more difficult to make now that massive
expansion of the SAPS has dramatically increased
the CJS's portion of the state salary bill. But there
needs to be a discussion and debate about what
should be regarded as satisfactory levels of
investment in the CJS. 
It remains an open question whether the current
move towards strengthening law enforcement will
be associated with real improvements in security.
Even if there are substantial reductions in crimes
such as murder, rape or robbery, in coming years
it is likely that the reasons for these declines will
be fiercely debated. It may be anticipated that the
strengthening of law enforcement will have some
impact on reducing crime levels. At the same
time, because it does not address the underlying
causes of crime, and because it also reinforces the
disposition that individuals may have towards
criminality, these effects will be limited.
The underlying premise of social crime
prevention is that well-implemented social crime
prevention interventions in fact offer results that
are more beneficial to society, in the long term,
than law enforcement based approaches alone. Yet
the tension remains that social crime prevention
measures do not offer the same immediate
satisfaction as visible strengthening of law
enforcement for the electorate. As Rauch and
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Simpson argued, 'Perhaps there is no more
important dynamic for [social] crime prevention
policy-makers to manage than this… tension
between the demand for instant results and
longer-term strategies and interventions.'17
Social crime prevention advocates tend to avoid
acknowledging the simple merit of law
enforcement systems: that they resolve the
immediate threat to the general public presented
by perpetrators (many of whom have a deeply
rooted investment in criminality) by incarcerating
them. This is because social crime prevention
advocates are often focused on motivating why
social crime prevention is better than law
enforcement in the face of the apparent
impossibility of shifting the state's narrow focus
on law enforcement. However, it is likely that
improvements in the functioning of the criminal
justice system may contribute to creating political
space for social crime prevention approaches. As
indicated, the NCPS itself argued that an effective
criminal justice system provides a 'vital
foundation' for crime prevention. Social crime
prevention advocates can share common ground
with those advocating for improved law
enforcement, subject to the acknowledgement
that improved law enforcement on its own will
not yield the desired results. 
Unfortunately the social crime prevention agenda
often seems to be intangible and vaguely defined.
This is an inherent conceptual difficulty of the
social crime prevention field, as there is no clear
way of delineating the boundaries of that field.
Furthermore, measures such as the provision of
primary and secondary education or social grants,
though not specifically targeted at addressing
crime, may also contribute to reducing crime
levels. In South Africa, where it is now widely
acknowledged that the provision of education is
fraught with problems, it is not a straightforward
matter as to how basic improvements in the
education system or other aspects of the social
crime prevention toolkit should be prioritised
relative to each other. While these are difficult
questions, if it were possible for social crime
prevention advocates to mobilise behind a more
tightly focused and clearly defined set of policy
measures, this might considerably enhance their
potential impact. That might include identifying
which aspects of what the state already delivers
qualify as social crime prevention, and
acknowledging them as achievements towards the
development of a fuller programme of social crime
prevention.
IS IT CORRECT TO ASSUME THAT
SOCIAL CRIME PREVENTION
PROVIDES A POTENTIAL SOLUTION
TO THE PROBLEM OF CRIME AND
VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA?
We need to consider whether a 'sophisticated'
social crime prevention agenda (which also
acknowledges the importance of law enforcement)
actually provides the hope of a 'solution' to the
high levels of crime and violence. Assessing this is
complicated by the fact that it is not clear where
social crime prevention measures begin and end.
For instance, it is widely acknowledged that
inequality is a key driver of violence in South
Africa. Yet measures to address inequality have
not featured on the agenda of those promoting
social crime prevention, no doubt because this
falls partly within the field of economics, an area
in which many crime prevention practitioners
have limited expertise. 
The social crime prevention discourse in South
Africa also tends to be strongly shaped by
international crime prevention discourse,
particularly the 'risk and resilience' concepts
referred to earlier, and there is a growing body of
South African research on these issues.18 Yet it is
reasonable to ask whether there are other factors
that fall outside the established discourse that
should be seen as contributing to the problem of
violence in South Africa. The specific question
here is about the legacy of South Africa's history
of institutionalised racism and racialised social
engineering, and its role in contributing to
violence and crime. Arguably the problem of
violence might be seen, at least in part, as a
manifestation of the psychological legacy of racial
colonialism. This may indicate that there are issues
of 'historical trauma', redress, internalised racism,
representation, or recognition, that are not usually
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recognised as part of the social crime prevention
agenda, and that need to be integrated into our
understanding of the causes of crime. In other
words, there may be factors contributing to crime
that are not recognised through the established
conceptual frameworks of those in the social
crime prevention field. 
These questions should challenge us to seek
clarity about the level or type of change that needs
to take place in South Africa if we are to reduce
violence and crime. There is clearly much that can
be gained from the insights that have emerged
from the crime prevention discourse in Western
countries. Yet there is also a need to be open to
understanding to what extent specifically South
African historical, political and economic factors
feed into our problems of crime and violence.
Exploring the role that factors of this kind play,
and considering the kinds of interventions that
may be needed to address them, should form part
of the social crime prevention agenda. If crime
and violence reflect in part 'structural problems',
or issues of social psychology, then this may
indicate that the social crime prevention agenda
needs to be located within a dialogue about the
need for other, perhaps deeper, levels of change
within South African society.
CONCLUSION 
In recent years social crime prevention advocates
have tended to become disillusioned with the
limited success of advocacy and with what can be
achieved by working through the state. However,
there is very little hope for long-term success if
the state is not part of the process of addressing
the socio-economic, political and historical
factors that contribute to high levels of crime. Key
questions include to what degree there is scope for
the state to take greater ownership and
responsibility for driving a sophisticated social
crime prevention agenda, and to what degree
social crime prevention advocates can effectively
engage with the state.  
While regressive measures (such as policing that
ignores human rights) should be opposed, it
would appear important that social crime
prevention advocates become more skilled at
articulating the relative role of a social crime
prevention agenda alongside the need for law
enforcement, rather than setting themselves up in
opposition to the latter.  
In addition, in order for any social crime
prevention advocacy to have an impact it would
appear important that such advocacy both reflects
clearly articulated and focused policy proposals,
and ensures that the proposals match the
resources and skills available to the state and
communities.
More generally, social crime prevention advocates
need to consider broadening their engagement
with actors other than the state to include social
movements or other civil society formations such
as trade unions, and should explore more fully the
political, historical and economic factors that are
not currently part of the established crime
prevention discourse.   
To comment on this article visit
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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